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Abstract
In this paper we address the broad question, how does the process of industrial
transformation, affect personal income distribution within a developing economy ?
The starting point of our analysis is Kuznets (1955). What clearly emerges from
Kuznets’s writings is that under certain circumstances, the process of
industrialisation would have very clear-cut implications for changes in the distribution
of income within the economy. In the first part of this paper we present our basic
arguments regarding the relation between the process of structural change and the
overall (personal) distribution of income within a developing economy. Thereafter we
examine the evidence from a group of eighteen developing countries from Asia and
Latin America as we try to ascertain the nature of empirical support for our
hypothesis regarding the relation between structural change and income inequality.
We find little support in the data for the Kuznetsian hypothesis of increasing
inequality with the industrial transformation of a developing economy. Rather, an
important point that emerges from our analysis is that the existence of an informal
sector plays an important role in determining how inter-sectoral labour movements
affect the overall distribution of income in the context of developing economies.
Keywords: Structural change; Income distribution; Informal Sector; Developing
Countries.
JEL Classification: O11, O15, O17.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Amit Bhaduri, Deepak Nayyar and Hiranya Mukhopadhyay for their
help and guidance in writing this paper. I would also like to thank Aditya
Bhattacharjea and Suresh Tendulkar for extremely helpful comments and
suggestions.  The usual disclaimer applies.1
1.  Introduction
In this paper we address the broad question, how does the process of industrial
transformation affect the personal distribution of income within a developing
economy?  As in any research work on personal income distributions, the starting
point of our analysis is also Kuznets (1955).  There is an old literature which points
out that as countries develop, it is expected there will be a change in the inter-
sectoral composition of output, with a rise in the shares of industry and service and a
fall in the share of agriculture in total output (see Johnston, 1970 for a survey of
these issues).  What clearly emerges from Kuznets’s writings is that this change in
the structure of production has very clear-cut implications for changes in the
distribution of income within the economy.  However in this paper we find that rather
than the process of industrial transformation per se, certain structural characteristics
of developing countries tend to affect the overall distribution of income in a significant
way.  In particular, an important point that emerges from our analysis is that the
existence of an informal sector plays an important role in determining how inter-
sectoral labour movements affect the overall distribution of income in the context of
developing economies.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  First we present our basic arguments
regarding the relation between the process of structural change and the overall
distribution of income within a developing economy
1. This section draws heavily on
the ideas developed in Kuznets (1955). Next we examine the evidence from a group
of eighteen developing countries from Asia and Latin America as we try to ascertain
the nature of empirical support for our hypothesis regarding the relation between
structural change and income inequality (Section 2). The importance of the informal
sector is then discussed in the context of the country experiences (Section 3).
Thereafter we present the main results obtained from an econometric analysis using
a panel data set on these eighteen countries, covering the thirty-five year period from
1960 to 1994 (Section 4). We conclude by presenting a summary of our main
findings (Section 5).
                                                          
1 We would like to clarify at the outset that in this paper we are interested in the distribution of
incomes (in particular, personal income distributions).  Thus we will not be addressing the broader
definitions of the standard of living, which incorporate the notion of “capabilities” (for a discussion of
these issues and generally for a discussion of the broader dimensions of inequality see Sen, 1997
and 2000).2
At this juncture we note that the impact of alternative growth strategies on
poverty has been widely analysed (see for instance, Cornea et al., 1987 and Lipton
and Ravallion, 1995).  However, we are interested in studying changes in the
distribution of income per se, which by itself (and apart from poverty) remains an
economic variable of immense importance. A growing volume of political economy
studies point out the importance of the distribution of income for determining political
and economic outcomes at the aggregate level (see for instance, Alesina and
Perotti, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Perotti, 1993 and Persson and Tabellini,
1994)
2.
In this paper insofar as we focus on structural change, in effect we are studying
one channel via which economic growth may affect the distribution of income.  There
are other equally important ways in which growth may affect income distributions,
such as the process of accumulation of savings and therefore the concentration of
income earning assets among economic agents. However analysis of these issues
lie beyond the scope of the present paper.
Section 1.  The Kuznets Curve, Structural Change and the Distribution of Income
Kuznets (1955, 1963) recorded an inverted U-shaped relation between per-capita
income and a measure of income inequality (the ratio of the share of income
accruing to the richest 20% of the population, to the poorest 40%) on the basis of
data on a set of developed and developing nations. This empirical inequality–
development relation is widely referred to in the literature as the Kuznets Curve.
Kuznets observed that relative income shares of the richest and poorest
population quintiles exhibited a tendency to move towards equality for developed
countries like the UK, Germany and the USA
3 in the first half of the twentieth century.
He speculated that income inequality in these countries had widened previously
                                                          
2This literature identifies a number of channels via which the distribution of income may affect
economic outcomes in general, and the rate of growth in particular.  For instance, governments in
highly unequal societies often adopt populist, re-distributive policies, resulting in high rates of taxation,
which may adversely affect the incentive to invest and thus retard growth.
3 “ In the United States, …. the shares of the two lowest quintiles rise from 13
1/2 per cent in 1929 to 18
per cent in the years after the second world war .…; whereas the share of the top quintile declines
from 55 to 44 per cent and that of the top 5 per cent from 31 to 20 per cent.  In the United Kingdom,
the share of the top 5 per cent of units declines from 46 per cent in 1889 to 43 per cent in 1910 or
1913, …. and to 24 per cent in 1947; the share of the lower 85 per cent remains fairly constant
between 1880 and 1913, between 41 and 43 per cent , but then rises to …. 55 per cent in 1947.”
[Kuznets (1955), page 4]3
during the nineteenth century. These were industrialised countries that experienced
prolonged periods of high growth and attained high per capita income levels by the
post war years and this process of rising per capita incomes was accompanied by a
relative narrowing of the income gap between the richest and the poorest income
groups in these economies.  As for the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America, these were largely agriculture-based, stagnant economies characterised by
low per capita income levels. However, income inequality tended to be higher in
these developing nations than in the developed Western countries
4.  From here the
following considerations led to the formulation of a possible inequality-development
relation : (a) income inequality tends to be high in developing countries with low per
capita income levels; (b) income inequality was relatively higher (as compared to
their current levels) in developed countries, when their per capita income levels were
lower; and (c) currently income inequality in high per-capita income developed
countries is lower, both as compared to their own past levels and to the levels of
inequality in the developing countries. This led Kuznets to conjecture that, there is
possibly a relation between countries’ per capita income levels and the extent of
inequality in their overall distribution of income and that, there is a turning point in
this relation. That is, at relatively low levels of per capita incomes, there is a
tendency for income inequality to increase as per capita income increases;
thereafter, at relatively higher per capita income levels, there is a tendency for the
extent of income inequality to actually narrow as per capita income increases. This
reasoning forms the basis of the ‘Kuznets Curve’ or the inverted-U shaped relation
between per capita income levels and the extent of inequality in the overall
distribution of income.
1.1.  The Literature on the Kuznets Curve
There is a large body of mainly empirical literature that attempts to establish and
explain the existence of the Kuznets Curve on the basis of data on developed and
developing countries (see for instance, Ahluwalia, 1976; Anand and Kanbur, 1993b;
Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Chenery et al., 1975; Deininger and Squire,
                                                          
4 “…compare the distributions for India and the United States. …the second quintile in India receives
only 9 per cent (of total income), the third 11, and the fourth 16; whereas in the United States, the
shares of these quintiles are 12, 16, and 22 respectively.” “The shares of the top quintile are 55 per
cent in India, … compared with 44 per cent in the United States …”  [Kuznets , op cit., pages 22 and4
1996b; Jha, 1995; Ogwang, 1994; Papanek and Kyn, 1986; Paukert, 1973; Ram,
1995; and Sundrum, 1990)
5. The most common empirical test for the existence of
the Kuznets curve involves running a cross-country regression with some measure
of income inequality as the dependent variable and with per-capita GDP (an index of
development) and the square of per-capita GDP as independent variables. The
studies differ mainly with respect to the functional form used to test the Kuznets
curve relation, the measure of inequality used, the countries included in the data set
and the determinants of inequality (other than per capita income) considered
6.
As for the theoretical framework underlying the empirical studies, several
studies introduce additional determinants of income inequality in a somewhat ad hoc
manner, without reference to any particular theoretical framework. For example,
Chenery and Syrquin (1975) introduce three other variables as regressors apart from
per capita income, viz., the share of agriculture in total output, the share of primary
exports in total exports, and the percentage of school enrolment, as indicators of a
country’s level of development. Others focus on specific determinants of income
inequality drawn from recent theories linking inequality and growth (e.g., Li et al.,
1998) or develop an independent theoretical framework for analysing the
determinants of inequality within the economy (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990).
Essentially, with the exception of Anand and Kanbur (1993a, b), this class of studies
does not directly analyse the change in the inter-sectoral composition of output and
employment and its implications for changes in income inequality. Anand and
Kanbur do focus on this issue
7, but in their empirical analysis they choose a
functional form involving per-capita income and its inverse as the independent
variables. That is, they do not directly incorporate variables relating to structural
change in the empirical part of their analysis.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21 respectively] .  The figures for India refer to 1950.  For the USA, these are average figures for the
post-war years of  1944, 1946, 1947 and 1950.
5See Bruno et al. (1998) and Kanbur (2000), for recent surveys of this literature.
6 Regarding the data used in these empirical studies, the datasets compiled by Paukert (1973), Jain
(1975), and later Fields (1989a, b) have been widely used in empirical studies of the Kuznets curve
relation. However, earlier due to the lack of a sufficiently long time series on inequality measures,
most empirical studies were based on cross-section data. For instance, Paukert (1973), Chenery et al.
(1975), Ahluwalia, (1976) and Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990) all test for the existence of a
Kuznets curve relation on the basis of cross section data.  More recently since the compilation of the
Deininger Squire (1996a) data set, authors have used panel data to investigate the existence of the
Kuznets curve (see eg. Bruno et al., 1998; Deininger and Squire, 1996c; and Li et al., 1998).
7 The relation between income distribution and the sectoral composition of aggregate output and
employment is formally analysed by  Anand and Kanbur (1993a). They show that the Lorenz class of5
There is mixed evidence from these studies regarding the existence of the
inequality-development relationship implied by the Kuznets curve.  While some
studies find an inverted U shaped relation between per capita income and inequality
(e.g. Ahluwalia, 1976; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Chenery and Syrquin,
1975; and Ogwang, 1994), others, particularly those based on panel data (eg. Anand
and Kanbur, 1993b; Bruno et al., 1998; and Deininger and Squire, 1996b)
demonstrate that the Kuznets curve does not exist.  In fact a number of studies find
evidence of a U-shaped relation between income and inequality (Anand and Kanbur,
1993b; Deininger and Squire, 1996b and Fields and Jakubson, 1995).
What does not emerge clearly from these studies is that the inequality-
development relation posited by Kuznets is driven by a particular kind of structural
change.  To our mind it is important to examine the nature of structural change in an
economy when one is studying changes in the overall distribution of income.  As
such our approach to analysing this issue brings the “Kuznets process” into clear
focus, where this term essentially refers to the process of structural change
underlying the inequality-development relation embodied in the Kuznets curve.
1.2.  Structural Change and the Distribution of Income
The process of development is supposed to be accompanied by a rise in the shares
of the non-agricultural sectors and a corresponding fall in the share of the agricultural
sector in total output. The distributional implications of this process would depend on
a number of factors.  For instance, we can imagine a hypothetical situation where a
rise in output of the industrial sector, is caused entirely by an expansion of
employment.  If the expansion of industrial employment is accompanied by a transfer
of labour from the agricultural to the industrial sector, following Kuznets (1955), it
would appear that this process has extremely clear cut implications regarding the
nature of change in overall income inequality in the economy, viz., inequality would
tend to increase. This follows from certain assumptions regarding inter-sectoral and
intra-sectoral income distributions.
Kuznets (1955, p.12) constructs a numerical example to illustrate the relation
between changes in sectoral employment shares and income inequality. He
assumes that in a two-sector economy  “ … the per capita income of sector B (non-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
indices of income inequality are aggregable, in the sense that overall income inequality can be
expressed as a function of sectoral-per capita incomes, -income inequalities and -population shares.6
agricultural) is always higher than that of sector A (agricultural); that the proportion of
sector A in the total number declines; and that the inequality of the income
distribution within sector A may be as wide as that within sector B but not wider”
8.
Therefore, as the relative share of the industrial sector in output and employment
rises, overall inequality tends to increase as labour moves from a low-income, low-
inequality agricultural sector to a higher-income, higher-inequality industrial sector.
We incorporate this idea in a simple formulation which we estimate using data
on a group of developing economies. Following the basic idea developed in Kuznets
(1955), we express economy-wide inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient, say),
as a function of sectoral output shares
9. That is, G = f (xa, xb), where xa and xb
represent the shares of output of the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors and
G denotes a measure of income inequality (e.g., the Gini coefficient).
We assume there are three sectors in the economy - agriculture, industry and
services.  That is, the non-agricultural sector is a composite sector, with industry and
services as its two main components.  Thus we can express,
G = f (xa, xb) = f (xa, xi, xs),
where, xa, xi, xs are the shares of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors in
total output.
Now expressed in percentage terms,
xa + xi + xs = 100.
Therefore,
G = f (xa, xi, (100 – xa – xi)).
Assuming a linear relation between the variables we can write,
G = α  + β . xa + δ .xi   -----------  (1)
This is the relation we estimate (estimation results are reported in Section 4 below).
The coefficient ‘β ’ indicates how income inequality changes with an “agriculture-
service” transition.  That is, a change in the share of agriculture in total output, when
                                                          
8 There is indirect evidence which suggests in general this is true for most developing countries.
Given that urbanisation is a natural concomitant of industrialisation, urban inequalities can be
regarded as a rough approximation of inequality ‘within’ the industrial sector. The data in Table 1A
(see Appendix Tables) shows that with few exceptions, urban inequality tends to be higher than rural
inequality (as measured by Gini coefficients) for most countries and at most points of time.
9 Here we would like to reiterate that standard empirical estimation of the Kuznets curve relation
typically regress income inequality on per capita income levels.  We argue that this approach fails to
bring out clearly the underlying relation between income inequality and changes in the inter-sectoral
output structure.  In contrast our approach clearly brings out the relation between income inequality
and the process of structural change.7
the share of industry is held constant and there is an offsetting change in the share
of services (such that the shares of the three sectors always add up to 100).
Analogously, ‘δ ’ measures the impact of an “industry-service” transition. That is, it
represents the partial effect of a change in the share of industry on income
inequality, holding the share of agriculture constant and with an offsetting change in
the share of services.  Therefore, when we estimate this equation, we are essentially
treating services as the residual sector, which adjusts passively to changes in the
shares of the other two sectors
10. The constant term ‘α ’ represents the level of
income inequality in the economy in the hypothetical case where both the shares of
agriculture and industry are zero and the entire economy is based on services
activity.
We report our estimation results in Section 4 below. But before that we outline
certain aspects of the inequality-structural change relation that emerge from a
preliminary data analysis.  An important point that emerges from this discussion is
that a certain structural characteristic of developing economies (viz. existence of an
informal sector) is likely to have an important influence on changes in the overall
distribution of income within such economies.
Section 2.  Evidence on Structural Change and Income Inequality from a Group
of Developing Countries
We work with data on eighteen developing countries – ten from Asia (Bangladesh,
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Thailand and
Korea) and eight from Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), covering the period 1960 to 1994
11. The
data on income inequality is taken from the Deininger and Squire (1996a) dataset
and from UNDP (1999)
12, while data on the structural change variables is from World
Bank (2000).  We use the Gini coefficient, which is the only available measure of
income distribution, comparable across a fairly large number of countries for which
                                                          
10 We also estimate two other equations, where, in turn, industry and agriculture are treated as
residual sectors. For details see Part B of the Appendix below.
11 For description of the final dataset and data related problems see Part A of the Appendix below.
12 We use  only the ‘high-quality’ observations on Gini coefficients from the dataset compiled by
Deininger and Squire (1996a) and we include only comparable observations from the UNDP (1999)
database (see Part A of theAppendix below for more details).8
we have observations over a reasonably long period of time
13.  We choose sectoral
output shares as our measure of structural change as comparable data on sectoral
employment shares is not available for all countries over our entire period of
analysis. However we also analyse the limited empirical evidence on sectoral
employment shares before drawing conclusions from this analysis.
A preliminary data analysis reveals that both Asian and Latin American
countries faced a more or less similar pattern of structural change, yet their
experience with regard to changes in the distribution of income differed.  We focus
on data on sectoral output shares for the period 1960 to 1994, since we do not have
data on sectoral employment shares covering the entire period.  However for the
relatively recent period, from 1980 to 1990, we do analyse the available evidence on
sectoral employment shares.
2.1.  Structural Change and Income Distribution in the Asian Countries
Analysis of the data on income distribution and structural change over the period
1960 to 1994 reveals the following picture.  We find that over this fairly long time
span of 35 years, income inequality remained more or less unchanged in almost all
the Asian countries in our sample (Table 1).








Source : Deininger and Squire (1996a) and UNDP (1999)
Note:
•   The Gini coefficients reported are average (unweighted) values for each country group,
over the 5- year periods reported.  However continuous data over the 5 years is not
available for each country, therefore even for each country the average figure calculated
does not often represent actual inequality over the full five years.
                                                          
13 Data on income shares of population quintiles are also available in the Deininger and Squire
dataset but there are fewer observations per country for this variable than for Gini coefficients.  This is
the primary reason we use the Gini coefficient despite its many limitations as a measure of income
inequality.  However in our empirical exercise we get similar results using the Gini coefficient and an
alternate measure of inequality based on quintile shares, viz.,  the ratio of the income share of the
richest 20% to the poorest 40% of the population (See Section 4 below for details).9
•   The numbers in parentheses below each variable value represents the number of
countries on which these averages are based. Names of the countries and details
regarding the years for which observations are available are listed in Table 2A in the
Appendix Tables at the end of this paper.
In most Asian countries, except for China and Thailand (where inequality rose over
the 1980s decade), the Gini coefficient changed very little and fluctuations in the Gini
coefficient stayed within a narrow band
14. Yet these countries experienced a
considerable degree of structural change over this period.  There was a significant
fall in the share of the agricultural sector, with corresponding increases in the shares
of the industrial and service sectors, in total output (Table 2).







•   The values of the variables are 5-yearly averages (unweighted) for each country-group.
•   Average values are taken to ensure comparability with the data on Gini coefficients for
which we have to consider average values, as continuous time series data are not
available for all countries in the sample.
•   We consider the data for the latter half of the sixties decade as we do not have averages
based on all 10 countries for the period 1960-1964.
                                                          
14 Comparing the figures for 1960-64 and 1990-94, in some cases eg. Bangladesh, Philippines and Sri
Lanka the Gini shows a slight decline. For Bangladesh and Sri Lanka this decline is probably due to a
change in the underlying method of calculating the Gini. For instance, for the last two years for which
income distribution data is available for Bangladesh (1989 and 1992) and for the latest year for which
data is available for Sri Lanka (1990) the Gini coefficient represents expenditure, rather than income,
inequality.  We adjust for this change in definition by increasing the expenditure based coefficients by
6.6 (as suggested by Deininger and Squire, 1996a and Li et al., 1998).  However we recognise that
this adjustment would help reduce the bias and not eliminate it completely.10
Table 3:  Inter-Sectoral Composition of Output and Employment in the
               Asian Countries             (%)
Output Shares Employment Shares Sectors
1980 1990 1980 1990
Agriculture 27.18 21.08 55.91 48.65
Industry 33.59 34.06 17.09 20.08
Services 39.23 44.86 26.15 30.63
Source:  World Bank (2000) and ILO (1999).
Note:
•   The output shares represent shares of value added in each sector as percentage of
GDP.
•   The employment shares represent shares of employment in each sector as percentage
of total employment.
•   For each period, the figures represent average values (unweighted) for ten countries,
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
China and Korea.
We do not have data on employment shares from 1960 onwards.  However we do
have limited data available on sectoral employment shares covering mainly the
1980s decade
15. Between 1980 and 1990 on average, the share of agriculture
declined and correspondingly the share of services rose, while the share of industry
in total output increased slightly (Table 3).  The basic change in the occupational
distribution of the workforce over the 1980s decade in the Asian economies involved
a fall in the share of agriculture, a small rise in the share of industry and a relatively
larger rise in the share of services in total employment. Yet for the ten Asian
countries we find that between 1980 and 1990, income inequality remained
unchanged in all the economies with the exception of China and Thailand.
Relating changes in the occupational distribution with the changing composition
of aggregate output reveals an interesting feature of the process of structural change
in the Asian economies.  Between 1980 and 1990, there was very little change in the
share of the industrial sector in total value added, while the share of the sector in
total employment increased. These figures seem to indicate that over the eighties
decade, on average employment opportunities opened up mainly in the low value-
added, low-wage segment of the industrial sector in a number of Asian economies.
                                                          
15 The employment data are from ILO (1999) and the starting point of this data set is 1980.  As such,
we are only able to focus on a period of ten years in this part of our analysis, covering the period from
1980 to the beginning of the 1990s decade.11
Arguably jobs were created mainly for low-skilled workers who are absorbed either
from the pool of the unemployed or from even lower paid jobs in the agricultural and
service sectors.
Ultimately what needs to be explained is the actual facts we observe for the
Asian economies. All these countries experienced the kind of structural change that
Kuznets describes.  However income inequality in the bulk of these countries seems
to have remained virtually unchanged over a span of almost thirty-five years.  Do we
conclude from here that the process of structural change does not affect the
distribution of income in the economy in the way that Kuznets outlined?  We argue
below that the explanation for this phenomenon may be closely linked with a
structural characteristic peculiar to developing countries, viz., existence of an
informal sector. This was absent in the developed economies whose experience
forms the basis of Kuznets’s arguments regarding structural change and income
distribution, which is why he ignores this issue completely. However it is surprising
that subsequent work in the Kuznetsian tradition has also chosen not to incorporate
the role of the informal sector in the context of developing economies.  For, there is
ample evidence that bears out the growing importance of this sector in developing
economies across the world.  In fact according to some estimates as much as sixty
percent of the workforce in developing countries operate in the informal sector (Ihrig
and Moe, 2000).
2.2.  Structural Change and Income Distribution in the Latin American Countries
In contrast to the Asian countries, between 1960 and 1990 income inequality
increased in the Latin American countries
16 (Table 4).
                                                          
16 The number of countries in the Latin American sample in the 1960s is too small to draw a firm
conclusion, at least in the aggregate, regarding change in inequality between 1960 and 1994.
However, we check that, (a) in 3 of the 4 countries (Brazil, Chile and Mexico) for which data on
inequality is available in the 1960s decade, income inequality increased between 1960 and 1994;  and
(b) for six of the eight Latin American nations in our sample (Costa Rica and Peru being the two
exceptions), comparing the earliest and the latest year for which data is available, we find that income
inequality worsened in each case.12








Source:  Deininger and Squire (1996a) and UNDP (1999)
Note:
•   The Gini coefficients reported are average values (unweighted) for each country group,
over the 5- year periods reported.  However continuous data over the 5 years is not
available for each country, therefore even for each country the average figure calculated
does not often represent actual inequality over the full five years.
•   The numbers in parentheses below each variable value represents the number of
countries on which these averages are based.  Names of the countries and details
regarding the years for which observations are available are listed in Table 2A in the
Appendix Tables at the end of this paper.
Over this period the pattern of structural change was similar to the Asian case
17, the
decline in the share of agriculture being accompanied by a significant rise in the
share of industry and a relatively smaller increase in the share of services in total
output (Table 5).
Table 5.  Sectoral Composition of Total Output in the







•   The values of the variables are 5-yearly averages (unweighted) for each country-group.
•   Average values are taken to ensure comparability with the data on Gini coefficients for
which we have to consider average values, as continuous time series data are not
available for all countries in the sample.
•   We consider the data for the latter half of the sixties decade as we do not have averages
based on all 8 countries for the period 1960-1964.
                                                          
17 However the Asian and Latin American countries differ in an important respect. Viz., in the former
countries, on average, the agricultural sector is largest in terms of share in employment, whereas in
the latter, it is the service sector, which employs the largest share of the total workforce.13
Table 6.  Inter-Sectoral Composition of Output and Employment in the
                 Latin American Countries  (%)
Output Shares Employment Shares Sectors
1980 1990 1980 1990
Agriculture 11.51 9.63 24.42 20.33
#
Industry 35.63 33.71 24.07 24.17
Services 52.87 56.67 46.57 55.3
Source:  World Bank (2000) and ILO (1999).
Note:
•   The output shares represent shares of value added in each sector as percentage of
GDP.
•   The employment shares represent shares of employment in each sector as percentage
of total employment.
•   For each year, the figures represent average values (unweighted) for six countries,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Venezuela.
•   Data on Colombia and Peru are excluded for the following reasons.  For Colombia, the
sectoral employment data refer only to the urban areas, while for Peru, the data for the
1990s refer only to Lima and as such is not comparable with the figures for 1980.
•   # For 1990, the agricultural employment data for Brazil excludes the rural population of
Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para and Amapa.  As such this figure tends to
overestimate the fall in the share of agricultural employment in Latin America.
However focussing on the sub-period 1980 to 1990 reveals a different picture (Table
6).  In particular, the experience of the six Latin American countries
18, with respect to
change in the structure of output over the 1980s decade, differs starkly from the
Asian countries’ experience in an important respect. In the bulk of the Latin American
countries included in our sample (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico), the share of
industry in aggregate output actually declined, and this shows up in the average
figures for the region as a whole (Table 4). The eighties saw a falling share of
agriculture in total employment, with a corresponding rise in the share of services
and a stagnant share of industry. As we discuss below, in all likelihood this
phenomenon is closely linked with these countries’ experience with the debt crisis
and the subsequent stabilisation and structural adjustment programs adopted by the
governments.
Regarding income distribution, between 1980 and 1990, income inequality
increased sharply in the Latin American countries. On average, the Gini coefficient
increased by almost 4 percentage points which is a very sharp increase indeed given
                                                          
18 In this part of the analysis we are compelled to exclude two Latin American countries (Colombia and Peru), as there is an urban bias in the data
on sectoral employment shares for these countries.14
the relatively short span of time that is considered. For each of the Latin American
countries considered (except Costa Rica), the distribution of income became more
uneven over the eighties decade.
In what follows we argue that the debt crisis had a significant impact on change
in income inequality in the Latin American countries.  But before that we go on to
discuss how the existence of an informal sector is likely to influence the overall
distribution of income in the context of these developing countries of Asia and Latin
America.
Section 3.  The Role of the Informal Sector
For the developing countries in our sample we observed a tendency for income
inequality to either increase slightly or remain more or less unchanged over a span
of more than three decades. The tendency for inequality to increase along with an
agriculture-industry transition can be explained in terms of Kuznets’s analysis in
terms of a movement of labour from a low per-capita income, low-inequality sector to
a relatively high per-capita income, high-inequality sector. However this theory
cannot explain why inequality remained more or less unchanged over a span of
nearly three decades as in most of the Asian economies. To understand the nature
of change in income inequality in the developing economies, we must first
understand clearly the exact nature of structural change experienced by these
economies. In particular one aspect of structural change in these countries, viz.,
growth of the ‘informal’ sector has received little attention in the literature on the
Kuznets curve, where the focus is on the nature of changes in per-capita incomes
and overall income inequality.
The main distinctions between the formal and informal sectors are the following:
(a) the formal sector is characterised by capitalist production modes and the informal
by traditional modes of production; (b) employment contracts in the formal sector are
legally binding (or are formulated within the framework of the existing legal
structure), whereas informal sector contracts are generally not backed by courts of
law; and (c) wages are lower in the informal than in the formal sector. Typically
official sources do not have accurate records of informal transactions; as such official
statistics tend to underreport the level of economic activities in this sector. In
particular, in available official statistics it is often not possible to find data classified
according to whether it pertains to the informal or the formal sector.15
In most developing countries informal sector activities tend to bypass
government regulations, especially regarding minimum wage laws and other labour
standards. Further this acts as a kind of a residual sector as it tends to absorb, in
large part, the bulk of ‘unemployment’ in the formal sector.  In developing countries
owing to the pressures of a burgeoning population, the number of job seekers tends
to exceed the number of job opportunities available in the formal sector. Typically
this residual who fail to get employment in the formal sector tend to get absorbed in
the informal sector, albeit at much lower wage rates.  Further owing to (b) above,
and because the bargaining power of workers is weaker than that of employers, the
quality of jobs in the informal sector, in terms of security of tenure, hours of work,
non-pecuniary benefits etc., is distinctly ‘lower’ than that of jobs in the formal sector.
An important characteristic of the development process in developing economies has
been the increasing importance of the informal sector in terms of its growing share in
both total employment and output. In particular there is ample evidence (mainly
based on individual case studies) that supports the growing importance of the
informal service sector in developing countries (see for instance, Agenor, 1996;
Fields, 1990; Ihrig and Moe, 2000; ILO, 1995 and 1998).  Further, the actual
experience of developing countries indicates that the service sector is quite sizeable,
in terms of contribution to aggregate output 
19, while the industrial sector is relatively
much smaller in size.  Also available evidence indicates that a large segment of the
labour force in developing nations moved directly from the agricultural to the service
sector, particularly informal services, without contact with the industrial sector (see
UNCTAD, 1988; Nayyar, 1994).
Another point worth noting is that in developing countries the non-agricultural
sector itself has a dualistic structure, with a formal and an informal sub-sector.  We
argued above that average wages in the informal sector lie well below that in the
formal sector.  Thus as workers move from the informal to the formal sector, they get
a hike in wages, much like the workers migrating from rural to the urban sector in the
Harris-Todaro framework.
In what follows we discuss how the existence of an informal sector is likely to
have influenced the overall distribution of income in the Asian and Latin American
economies.
                                                          
19 On average, over half of total output of the Latin American economies and more than two-fifth of
total output in the Asian economies is accounted for by service output; see Tables 1 and 2 in the text.16
3.1.  The Asian Economies
In view of the discussion above, consider the impact, on the distribution of income, of
the following kind of transition from an agriculture-based economy.  Suppose the fall
in the share of agriculture in total output is accompanied by an expansion of output
primarily in the informal segment of the non-agricultural sector.  Given that wages in
the informal sector are low, often those moving from agriculture (where wages are
also low) to the non-agricultural sector would not experience any significant rise in
incomes, even though they are moving to a sector where average wages (especially
in the formal sector) are higher than in the agricultural sector of the economy.  In this
case, even with structural change, overall inequality in the economy would be
relatively unaffected owing to the particular nature of this change.  At the very basic
level, income inequality is essentially about the distance between the incomes
earned by the richest and the poorest income earners in the economy.  Now with the
above kind of structural change, there is a flow of labour between sectors that does
not involve the poor getting significantly richer. That is, this movement of labour is
essentially confined within the lower income groups and it does not change the
position of the poor classes vis a vis the richer classes in a significant way. That is
why this particular kind of labour mobility tends to leave the overall distribution of
income fairly unaffected.
However, the informal sector is at best a minor residual in a few Asian countries
in our sample, particularly, Korea, Malaysia and China (until the 1990s). These
countries, particularly Korea and China, had put in place radical agrarian reforms,
which undoubtedly accounts for the relatively lower inequality in these countries as
compared to the others included in our study.  Government policies geared to
directly tackle inequality in the distribution of assets (particularly land) in general, and
agrarian reforms in particular, have no doubt contributed to keeping income
inequality from increasing very much in these countries.
3.2.  The Latin American Economies
We now argue that the presence of an informal sector may also have influenced
changes in income inequality in the Latin American nations, particularly in the
decade of the 1980s. We noted earlier that income inequality increased in all Latin
American nations over the eighties decade.  Now the 1980s have been referred to as17
the ‘lost decade’ in the history of these nations (see for instance, Cardoso and
Helwege, 1995; Edwards and Larrain, 1989; Eichengreen and Lindert, 1991; and
Sachs, 1988).  It seems plausible to argue that the structural adjustment programs
put in place over this period affected the structure of output and employment and
therefore the process of income generation and distribution. There is an extensive
literature that deals with the experience of Latin American countries since the debt
crisis (for an extensive bibliography see Corbo and Fischer, 1995).  The basic points
that emerge from it can be summarised as follows.
For the Latin American nations, in general, the decade of the 1970s was
characterised by mounting internal and external imbalances.  Fiscal excesses spilled
over to the external accounts and most of these nations built up huge external debt
obligations in order to finance deficits.  Funds were easily available in the 1970s
decade, particularly in the wake of the oil price rise.  Oil exporting countries invested
oil revenues primarily with commercial banks that, in turn, lent to these countries.
However the situation changed in the early 1980s when, in 1982, the US Federal
Reserve raised interest rates in a bid to control inflation.  Higher interest rates made
the USA a more attractive alternative for lenders. As a result, credit availability
dropped sharply for Latin America.  Alongside there was also a rise in the cost of
credit. With mounting interest payments on debt, the burden of debt service
increased, while indicators like debt-GDP and debt-export ratios rose steadily for the
Latin American countries. The situation worsened further, when consequent upon
the interest rate hike in the USA, followed by Europe, economic activity slowed down
across these nations.  For, this reduced the demand for Latin American exports, and
commodity prices crashed, making debt repayment appear increasingly difficult.
Matters came to a head, with Mexico declaring a moratorium on debt obligations.
This spread like contagion in the region and finally most of these nations had to
adopt stabilisation and structural adjustment packages administered by international
institutions like the International Monetary Fund.  Fiscal restraint was an essential
part of these policies, and typically, the reduction in deficits came about at the cost of
spending on infrastructure, investment on human capital and other social sector
spending.  On the other hand, with bleak prospects for export growth
20, drastic
import compression was necessary in the short run to manage the external
                                                          
20 Not much could be done to increase exports, as the major export markets in the US and Europe
were in the midst of a recession.18
payments crisis. The result of these policies was economic recession which, in
effect, slowed down the process of industrialisation across the region
21.
In an atmosphere of economic recession, income inequality is likely to increase,
as the demand for labour tends to fall and consequently, the rate of employment
creation slows down, and many lose jobs.  All this tends to create downward
pressure on wages. Further, with cuts in government spending on social sectors,
invariably the position of the poorer groups in society become worse. In fact,
typically, during an economic slowdown, the poorer income classes lack the ability to
protect their real incomes, unlike the relatively richer groups in society and this tends
to make the overall distribution of income more uneven.  This is especially true in the
Latin American countries, where the poor have little ‘social security’, unlike in many
European countries.  Further, during an economic downturn the rich often fall back
on asset incomes (either from sale of assets or from their yield); whereas, typically
the poor lack income earning assets, and tend to suffer a greater fall in real incomes.
We argue that in such a situation, the informal sector acts as a residual,
absorbing the bulk of those losing employment in the formal industrial sector and
also those unable to find ‘good’ jobs in an environment of economic slowdown.  In
fact there is evidence that in the eighties decade the size of the informal sector grew
in the Latin American economies.  According to Turnham (1993), the share of the
informal sector in Latin America rose from 40% in 1980, to 47% in 1985 and 55% in
1993.  During 1983-89 employment in Latin America increased at an annual rate of
about 3% (in line with economic growth) but a large proportion (almost 80%) of the
new jobs were in the informal sector (own account workers, domestic service, micro-
enterprises etc.).  At the same time the share of the modern sector (medium and
large private enterprises and the public sector) in total employment fell from about
60% in the early 1980s, to around 45% in 1993.  We argue, but for this residual role
of the informal sector, income inequality would probably have increased even more
than it actually did in the Latin American nations. By absorbing a large section of the
population, even at minimal wages, it kept the bottom end of the income distribution
from worsening further.
Against the backdrop of this discussion, we report below the results from an
econometric analysis.
                                                          
21 There was a dramatic decrease in investment rates across Latin American nations, particularly in the
period 1982-87 (Agarwal et al, 1999).19
Section 4.  Results from an Econometric Analysis
We estimate the following model based on the simple formulation relating income
inequality and structural change, which was developed in Section 1.2 above :
G = α L + β L. A + δ L.I +  (α A  - α L ).D +  (β A - β L).(D*A) +(δ A - δ L).(D * I) + ε ,
where,  G stands for Gini Coefficient; A and I represent the shares of the agricultural
and industrial sectors in total value added; the subscripts L and A represent
coefficient values for the Asian and Latin American countries respectively; and D is a
dummy variable that takes the value one for the Asian countries and zero for the
Latin American nations.
The equations are estimated using the pooled OLS (ordinary least squares)
estimation procedure
22.  Details regarding the final dataset, data sources, problems
related to the data, especially relating to missing data etc. are discussed in Part A of
the Appendix.
The estimated equation is :
G =  52.33
* +  0.09. A  +  0.00. I    + 11.53. D  -  0.34
* (D*A)  - 0.38
* (D*I),
        (6.39)     (0.14)        (0.15)         (8.34)        (0.17)             (0.18)  [Adj. R
2  = 0.55]
[Note 
* represents coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower; figures
in parentheses below each coefficient is its White heteroscedasticity-consistent robust
standard error]
The rest of the regression results are discussed in detail in Part B of the Appendix
below.
                                                          
22 For the reason we use the pooled ols rather than the fixed effects estimator, see the discussion in
Part C of the Appendix below.20
The main results from our regression exercise can be summarised as follows
23 :
(a) An agriculture-industry transition does not affect income distribution in the Asian
economies. However a transition involving the service sector may lead to a
worsening of income distribution. For inequality tends to increase with either an
agriculture-service transition or an industry-service transition for the Asian
economies.
(b) Structural transformation per se does not seem to affect income inequality within
the Latin American countries in our sample.  For neither an agriculture-industry
transition nor a service-industry transition, or an agriculture-service transition has
any affect on income distribution for these countries.
(c) The constant term in the regression with the shares of agriculture and industry as
independent variables, indicates what inequality would be in a scenario where
both these output shares were zero, and the entire economy was based on
service sector activity. This term is interpreted as being indicative of inequality
within the services sector in this counterfactual scenario. Analogously we obtain
estimates that are indicative of inequality within the agriculture and industrial
sectors as well (from regressions of the Gini coefficient  (i) on the shares of
service and industry and (ii) on the shares of agriculture and service,
respectively).  The main result we get from here is that in both country groups
inequality is lowest within the agricultural sector. This result is in line with the
Kuznetsian assumption underlying the relation between structural change and
income distribution
24.  Our estimates also indicate that for the Asian countries,
                                                          
23 Using an alternate measure of inequality, Ineq (ratio of share of the top 20% to the bottom 40% of
income earners) as the dependent variable we get similar results :
(a) with shares of Agriculture and Industry as dependent variables
 Ineq = 3.25
*  +  0.02. A   +   0.04. I    + 2.69. D -  0.09
* (D*A)  -  0.08
* (D*I), …..(1)
            (0.17)    (0.04)           (0.04)        (1.11)      (0.03)             (0.04)
[Adj. R
2  = 0.47; Nob = 85]
(b) with shares of Agriculture and Service as dependent variables
Ineq = 7.33
* -  0.02 . A – 0.04 . S – 5.56
* . D +  0.11. (D*A) + 0.08
*. (D*S)……..(2)
           (2.86)   (0.03)       (0.04)      (2.25)         (0.34)             (0.03)
[Adj. R
2  = 0.47; Nob = 85]
24  Kuznets (1955), assumes that inequality within the agricultural sector is lower than (or no higher
than) that within the non-agricultural sector.21
inequality is highest within the services sector, whereas for the Latin American
economies, it is more or less similar within the industrial and services sectors.
(d)  Introducing the growth rate of GDP (annual average rate of growth) as an
additional explanatory variable does not change any of our results on the relation
between income inequality and structural change
25. However we find that given
structural characteristics of the economy, a higher rate of growth is associated
with greater income inequality in the Latin American economies and with a
reduction (although the magnitude of this effect is very small) of income inequality
in the Asian economies. This is an interesting result but analysis of the relation
between economic growth and income inequality lies beyond the scope of the
present paper
26.  What’s important for our purpose here is that our results
regarding inequality and structural change go through even after controlling for
differential growth rates across economies and over time.
The  most important result that emerges from our regression analysis is that a
transition from agriculture to industry does not affect income inequality in either
country group. We discuss the implications of this result in turn for each country
group.
Our results seem to fit the Asian experience rather well.  For the data indicates
that even as these economies underwent substantial agriculture-industry transition,
income inequality remained more or less unchanged.  This can happen, for instance,
when the movement of labour from agriculture to industry is primarily confined within
the informal segment of the sectors.  Such movement of labour within the low-wage
                                                          
25 Introducing the annual average rate of growth of GDP (in constant US dollars) as an additional
explanatory variable we get the following results,
G = 50..35
* - 0.18. A + 0.01 . I + 0.72
*. GR  + 13.82. D – 0.27
* (D*A)  - 0..38
* (D*I)  –  0.77
* (D*GR)
       (6.35)     (0.14)      (0.15)     (0.20)            (8.58)        (0.11)            (0.15)             (0.25)
[Adj. R2 = 0.57 ;   Nob = 102]
GR represents annual average growth rate of GDP and as before figures in parentheses below each
coefficient represents the White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and coefficients marked
with a 
* represent statistical significance at 5% level or lower.
26 We conjecture that this result shows that for countries with high levels of inequality (such as the
Latin American countries in our sample), growth exacerbates existing inequities and leads to widening
inequality. For countries where inequality is relatively lower (the Asian economies in our sample),
growth creates more equal opportunities and rather than exacerbating disparities may even reduce
income inequality.  However this remains only a conjecture for a fuller explanation of this result would
require more rigorous analysis of the interrelations between inequality and growth, which lies beyond
the scope of the present paper.22
segment of sectors would not significantly alter the gap between top and bottom
incomes and therefore, overall inequality within the economy.
In the Asian case, our results also indicate that either an agriculture-service
transition or an industry-service transition would lead to a rise in inequality.  Now for
the Asian economies, income inequality is likely to be quite high within the service
sector for the following reasons. It is a well-established fact that informal services
account for a large proportion of the informal sector in most developing countries and
that informal sector wages are among the lowest in the economy (ILO, 1995 ; 1998).
Thus on the one hand the service sector comprises of a segment of income earners
who earn some of the lowest wages in the entire economy. On the other hand,
considering the service incomes of top doctors, lawyers, financiers and bankers, it is
apparent that some of the highest wages in the economy are also earned in this
sector
27. This stark contrast between top and bottom incomes would tend to make
the distribution of income within the service sector extremely skewed. In all
probability, our results involving the service sector reflect this fact.
For the Latin American countries, it is not simply an agriculture-industry
transition, but the process of structural transformation per se does not seem to affect
the overall distribution of income.  We have already noted that there are many gaps
in the data on income distribution for the 1960s and 1970s, pertaining to these
economies.  As such the regression results primarily reflect changes that occurred in
these countries over the 1980s decade onwards.  Therefore the eighties debt crisis
(and the policy response to it) is likely to have a lot to do with the results we have
obtained.  We have already discussed that the policy regime in the Latin American
countries in the aftermath of the debt crisis, with its emphasis on fiscal restraint and
import compression, reinforced recessionary conditions. We argued that such
conditions are likely to make the overall distribution of income more uneven.  In this
context we interpret the regression results as indicating that rather than the process
of structural change, other factors such as exogenous shocks and government
policies causing economic slowdown, are likely to have affected income inequality in
the Latin American countries.
                                                          
27 In particular, with greater openness in the developing countries, multinational capital has
increasingly sought to relocate activities to the developed world and hire the services of labour that is
much cheaper in comparison with their developed country counterpart (see for instance, Oxfam,
2002).23
Section 5.  Conclusion
The basic question we finally address is to what extent does structural
transformation explain the actual pattern of change in income inequality observed in
the Asian and Latin American economies.  We saw that income inequality remained
more or less unchanged over our period of analysis for the Asian countries, while it
increased in the Latin American countries. To what extent, on the basis of our
regression exercise, can we claim that the pattern of structural change essentially
explains the nature of change in income inequality in these economies?
Our main result, that an agriculture-industry transition does not affect overall
inequality, seems to fit the Asian experience rather well.  These countries underwent
an agriculture-industry transition and yet did not experience much change in overall
income inequality. These results provide some support for our argument regarding
the importance of the informal sector in affecting the overall distribution of income.
However even in the Asian context, we realise that the informal sector
explanation applies only to a subset of economies and that even then it cannot
explain all of the change in inequality that occurred (or did not occur) in this subset.
Clearly forces other than structural change are at work and in particular, the role of
government policies is clearly indicated.  For, in countries like China, we see a fairly
sharp rise in inequality from the eighties, coinciding with a major change in the
Chinese government’s policy stance, which especially served to dilute its
redistributive role in a major way.  The importance of government policies is also
borne out by the low and steadily falling inequality in the Korean case, which no
doubt is attributable, in large part to the Korean government’s success with land
reform policies.
Regarding the Latin American economies, our results indicate the importance of
factors other than structural change as being primarily responsible for changes in the
overall distribution of income. In particular, they point to the importance of
government policies in shaping the overall economic parameters, which in turn affect
incomes at the top and bottom ends of the distribution.   The sharp rise in inequality
over the eighties decade in each of the Latin American countries in our sample,
seems to be directly related to the debt crisis and the government’s policy response
to it.  We argued that in an atmosphere of economic recession, income inequality is
most likely to increase, as the poor and unskilled are likely to suffer greater fall in
incomes than the rich, who may fall back on asset incomes as a form of insurance.24
In this situation, the informal sector may serve as a residual sector and absorb those
who lose jobs, albeit at some of the lowest wages in the economy.  There is
evidence that shows that in Latin America the service sector, especially informal
services played just such a role.  Thus we argue that had it not been for the informal
sector, income inequality would have worsened further in the Latin American
economies.
In conclusion, regarding the relation between structural change and the
distribution of income, we find only weak links between the two. In particular there is
little support in the data for the Kuznetsian hypothesis of increasing inequality with
the industrial transformation of a developing economy.  However a particular
structural characteristic of developing economies seems to have had an important
bearing upon changes in the overall distribution of income. This relates to the role of
the informal sector, which we have stressed time and again in our analyses above.
In addition the importance of a number of other factors, in affecting the overall
income distribution is also brought out. These relate to the role of exogenous shocks,
such as the Latin American debt crisis and also to the importance of government
policies - both long run (e.g. policies involving institutional changes, like land
reforms) and short run (e.g. stabilisation policies aimed at restoring internal and
external balance in the short- to medium-term).25
APPENDIX
Part A.  Description of the Data
For our empirical analysis we focus on a set of four economic variables. These are,
the degree of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) and the
sectoral output structure represented by the shares of agriculture, industry and
service in total value added (for each country for any given year, the three output
shares add up to 100).
a)  Sources of Data  The data on the shares of agriculture, industry and service in
total value added (as % of GDP) are taken from World Bank (2000).  The data on
the Gini coefficient are mainly taken from Deininger and Squire (DS from now)
(1996a). The DS data set has time series data on Gini coefficients and income
shares of population quintiles for 136 developed and developing countries
28. The
‘high-quality’ data satisfy the following criteria
29 :
(i)  the unit of observation has to be either the household or the individual;
(ii)  the coverage of the population has to be comprehensive. For example, if only
the urban household distribution of income is available, it is not permissible to
translate this directly into the national distribution. The same rule applies if
available data is restricted only to the economically active, to wage earners
alone etc.; and
(iii)  the measurement of income (or expenditure) has to be comprehensive. That
is, income from self-employment and production for self-consumption should
be included.
There are many missing data points in the DS dataset. As such we do not have
continuous time series data on Gini coefficients for most countries in our sample.
We fill in the gaps in our dataset, using comparable data on Gini coefficients from the
                                                          
28 The data we use are an updated version of the data-base described in Deininger and Squire (1996a), available
at the World Bank web site.  A number of African countries have been added in this version.  As a consequence
the number of countries in this version is 136 and not 105 as reported in Deininger and Squire (1996a).
29 These criteria are similar to those used by Fields (1989a, b) to construct a usable dataset on income inequality.26
UNDP (1999) database whenever this is feasible.  However even then there are a
number of missing observations on the income distribution variable (see Table 2A
below for details regarding missing data).
b) The Final Dataset    We now set out in detail our criteria for selecting countries
for the empirical part of the analysis. Since availability of data on income distribution
posed the biggest constraint, we first selected those countries for which distribution
data were available. The DS dataset brings together data on 136 developed and
developing countries from across the world. Of these, there are 93 developing
countries with “high-quality” observations on Gini coefficients for at least one year
30.
Given that income inequality changes slowly over time within a country, we wanted
to select all those developing countries for which high quality data was available over
a fairly long period of time
31.  Essentially we wanted to study change in distribution
for as many countries and as long a period of time as possible, given the availability
of data.
Relatively few countries had data for the 1960s decades, which is why we did
not make this a criterion for selecting a country
32.  Initially we chose all those
countries which had at least one data point corresponding to each of the 1970s and,
either the 1980s or the 1990s decades. This yielded a set of thirty-two countries –
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China
33, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
                                                          
30 Data on percentile income shares is also available, however this data is available for a fewer
number of countries and for most countries, for a fewer number of years as compared to data on Gini
coefficients. As such we do not use an inequality measure based on this data in our main empirical
analysis. However we also run regressions using an alternate measure of income inequality (based
on the ratio of the income share of the top 20%, to the bottom 40% of the population) as the
dependent variable. This does not change any of our results. The same set of results go through with
these regressions which are based on a smaller number of observations as compared to the Gini-
regressions.
31 In order to achieve this objective, data from the DS dataset is at times supplemented with (strictly
comparable) data from another recent compilation of data on income distribution, UNDP (1999). The
details regarding this are provided in Footnote 31.
32 Data on sectoral output shares from World Bank (2000) was available only from 1960 onwards.
Naturally therefore the starting point of our period of analysis is 1960.
33 In the DS dataset, Gini coefficients on China are available only from the 1980s decade onwards.
However we are still able to include China in our sample because distribution data on China  for the
1960s and 1970s was available in UNDP (1999), which puts together data on various measures of
income inequality from the DS dataset as well as from other sources. In choosing data from UNDP
(1999) we ensure that the data are strictly comparable to the DS data, in terms of unit of
measurement (i.e. whether household or individuals), category of measurement (i.e. whether income
or expenditure), whether calculations are based on net or gross incomes, coverage of the population
(i.e. whether national or regional) and so on.  In the final dataset we include data for the following
countries and for the following years also from UNDP (1999) : Brazil (1990, 1991); China (1964, 1970,27
Egypt, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Korean Republic,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Singapore,
Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad, Tunisia, Venezuela
and Zambia.
The problem we encountered then was that we had an unequal number of
observations (over time) per country. For example, for India there were thirty
observations on Gini coefficients covering the period 1952 to 1992 (with a few
missing data in the middle), while for Seychelles there were only two Gini coefficients
for the years 1978 and 1984. Our objective was to generate a balanced panel
dataset with an equal number of observations over time for each country, spanning
the period 1960 to 1994.  With this view, we divided our entire period of analysis into
seven sub-periods of five years each - 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-
84, 1985-89 and 1990-94 and take five-yearly averages of the Ginis
34 and each of
the other variables. Now if we chose only those countries which had seven
observations (corresponding to each of the seven sub-periods), very few countries
(only six) would be selected in the final dataset. To include a larger number of
countries therefore, we had to allow for the inclusion of countries with missing
observations
35.
In the final dataset only those countries were included for which we had at least
4 observations. This ruled out the inclusion of a number of small Latin American
and Caribbean nations, as well as a number of African and Middle-Eastern countries
in our final dataset.  For instance, for each of Guatemala, Egypt, Puerto Rico and
Trinidad, only three observations (per country) were available; Panama, Seychelles
and Zambia had 2 observations each; while only one observation was available for
Tanzania.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1978); Colombia (1993, 1994); Mexico (1994); Pakistan (1963); Philippines (1975); Sri Lanka (1969); and
Thailand (1971).
34 However due to the lack of continuous time series data on income distribution, the average values for
Gini coefficients do not always cover the entire five year time period. For instance, for Malaysia, the values
of each of the dependent and independent variables for the period 1970-74 are actually an average for the
two years 1970 and 1973 for which data on income distribution is available. Also for the income distribution
variable, when an observation is missing for a country for a particular year, we replace it by an observation
from the closest year available in the preceding five years. Since the distribution of income within an
economy tends to be relatively stable over short periods of time, this should not affect our results
significantly.  For example no data is available for Malaysia for any of the years corresponding to the period
1990-94. However data is  available for 1989. So we use the data for 1989 to represent the Gini coefficient
for Malaysia for the period 1990-94. Note a number of scholars using the DS dataset have applied this
method (see for instance, Forbes, 1997).
35 For instance, Venezuela, which is included in the final dataset had 2 missing observations,
corresponding to 1960-64 and 1965-69.28
Next we checked the availability of data on sectoral output shares from World
Bank   (2000).  This ruled out the inclusion of Iran because no data was available on
sectoral output shares, for the years for which data on Ginis was available for this
country.  This also ruled out the inclusion of Taiwan as no data was available on this
country from this source
36.
Finally, three countries were excluded from the final dataset even though they
satisfied our selection criterion (of at least 4 observations per country). These were
Hong Kong, Singapore and Tunisia. Regarding Tunisia, we did not want to include
only one African country as it did not seem reasonable to consider one country as
being representative of the African region in any sense.  Regarding Hong Kong and
Singapore, these were not included because they are essentially city-states with very
little agricultural resources.  As such it does not make much sense to talk about an
agriculture-industry transition in the context of these economies.
Ultimately we selected eighteen countries, ten from Asia (Bangladesh, China,
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand)
and eight from Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), which met our selection criteria and yielded
a reasonably balanced dataset for the empirical analysis.  We had a panel data set
with eighteen countries and 7 observations per country, corresponding to average
values over the following time periods: 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-
84, 1985-89 and 1990-94. This should have generated a total number of 126
observations, however due to missing observations (particularly on Gini coefficients),
there are large gaps in the data set. In fact we have only 103 observations on Gini
coefficients (see Table 1A below for details of missing observations for particular
countries) and in the final data set we have 102 observations for which data are
available for each of the variables in focus.
c)  Data Related Problems    There are several problems related to the income
distribution data we use.  We include only the ‘high quality’ estimates of the Gini
coefficient reported by DS. These estimates have been compiled so as to ensure
intertemporal and international comparability.  Specifically they are based on national
                                                          
36For all the other countries in the sample our source of data for the output shares and trade
openness variables is World Bank (2000).  Hence we did try to include data on Taiwan from any other
source as it might not have been comparable with the data for the rest of the countries in our sample.29
household surveys and comprehensive coverage of the population and sources of
income and uses of expenditure.  In the DS dataset, for a number of countries the
Gini coefficients represent inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditures
(as for India) rather than income.  To make the data comparable across countries in
this case DS suggest that the expenditure based Gini coefficients be increased by
6.6 points as this is the average difference between income and expenditure based
Gini coefficients in the sample.  Another problem is that some Gini coefficients are
calculated on the basis of gross income and others on the basis of net income.
Further, for some countries the basic income recipient unit is the individual, while for
others it is the household. In some cases for the same country the definition of the
Gini coefficient is different in different years (e.g. for Bangladesh the Gini in 1989
and 1992 represent consumption inequality while the other observations all
represent income inequality).  Li et al. (1998) study the DS dataset in detail and in
their regressions they introduce dummy variables to control for these differences in
definition. They find only the difference arising due to income- and expenditure-
based Gini coefficients is statistically significant. Thus following Li et al. we also
adjust the expenditure based coefficients by increasing them systematically by 6.6
points as suggested by DS.  All the results reported are based on the adjusted Gini
coefficients.
Another problem might have arisen due to the nature of the underlying source
of data used for calculation of the Gini coefficients.  A recent paper by Milanovich
(2002) shows clearly that income estimates based on National Accounts data can
diverge (often widely) from estimates based on Household Survey data
37.  In a panel
dataset this can lead to bias arising from two sources. First, there can be inter-
temporal bias for a single country arising from combining observations based on
household data with those based on national accounts statistics.  Second, there can
be inter-country bias arising from the fact that for some countries income estimates
are based on household surveys and for others on national accounts data.  However
this problem does not arise in our data set, for DS ensure that only Gini coefficients
                                                          
37Typically household surveys underreport  (i) undisbursed corporate profits, (ii) income from property,
(iii) personal taxes and (iv) government transfers in kind. (i) and (ii) could be classified as capital
income , which is the most underreported income category in household surveys. Milanovic (2002)
provides further details in this regard.30
based on household surveys are included in their high quality database
38. For
instance for India, the data are taken from Datt (1995) and all the (expenditure
based) Gini calculations are based on NSS (household survey) data.
Part B.  Details of the Regression (Pooled OLS) Exercise
39
The linear equation we estimate is as follows :
                G = α L + β L. A + δ L.I +  (α A  - α L ).D +  (β A - β L).(D*A) +(δ A - δ L).(D * I) + ε
where,  G = Gini Index measuring income inequality within the economy, A = Value
added in the agricultural sector expressed as a percentage of GDP,  I = Value added
in the industrial sector expressed as a percentage of GDP and  ε  = Random error
term. We introduce a dummy variable to control for the structural differences
between the Latin American and Asian country groups. The subscript ‘L’ represents
the coefficients for the Latin American countries and ‘A’ for the Asian countries; and
D is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for all Asian countries and 0 for Latin
American countries.
The estimated equation is:
(1a) G = 52.33
* + 0.09. A  + 0.00. I + 11.53. D - 0.34
* (D*A) - 0.38
* (D*I), [Adj. R
2  = 0.55]
             (6.39)     (0.14)      (0.15)      (8.34)       (0.17)           (0.18)
[Note 
* represents coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower; figures
in parentheses below each coefficient is its White heteroscedasticity-consistent robust
standard error.]
The explanatory power of the regression is quite good as indicated by the fairly high
value of the adjusted correlation coefficient.  The intercept dummy being insignificant
indicates that the constant term of the regression is essentially similar for both sets
of countries. That is, according to our interpretation of the regression constant,
inequality within the service sector is similar within the Asian and Latin American
group of countries.  However what differs between the two sets of countries is the
impact of structural change upon the distribution of income.  For Latin American
countries both coefficients of A and I are statistically insignificant. This indicates,
                                                          
38 Deininger and Squire (1996a) “…require that data on inequality be based on actual observation of
individual units drawn from household surveys;”. In particular the authors “…do not use data based on
information from national accounts and some assumption regarding a general functional form
according to which different types of income are distributed.” [Deininger and Squire (1996a), page
568].
39 See the next section for a comparison of the pooled ols, with the fixed effects estimator.31
neither an agriculture-service transition (i.e. a fall in the share of agriculture and a
corresponding rise in the share of service in total output, holding the share of
industry constant), nor an industry-service transition would have much impact upon
overall inequality for the Latin American economies.  While for the Asian countries
we find that, both an agriculture-service transition and an industry-service transition
would tend to increase the level of inequality in the economy.
In reality however we observe not only an agriculture-service transition for these
two groups of countries but also essentially an agriculture-industries transition.  We
now re-estimate the above equation, with the shares of agriculture and service as
regressors.  This gives an idea as to how income inequality would change if the
share of industry were to rise with a decline, especially in the share of agriculture in
total output.  The estimated equation is :
(1b) G = 52.61
* - 0.10.A  - 0.00.S - 26.26
*.D + 0.03.(D*A) + 0.38
*.(D*S),  [Adj. R
2=0.55]
             (9.5)      (0.14)     (0.15)    (10.98)      (0.16)            (0.18)
[Note 
* represents coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower; figures
in parentheses below each coefficient is its White heteroscedasticity-consistent robust
standard error]
This equation suggests that neither an agriculture-industry, nor a service-industry
transition has any effect of income distribution in the Latin American countries.
Regarding the Asian countries it appears that an agriculture-industry transition does
not affect inequality, but a service-industry transition (i.e. a fall in the share of service
and a corresponding rise in the share of industry, holding the share of agriculture
constant), tends to reduce overall income inequality in these economies. The
constant term and the intercept dummy are both significant, which indicates that the
estimates of inequality within the industrial sector
40 are significantly different for the
two country groups.  In particular the distribution of income within the industrial
sector is more egalitarian for the Asian than for the Latin American countries as
indicated by the values of the constant terms for each country group (26.35 for Asian
countries as compared to 52.61 for the Latin American countries).
We estimate a final equation to get an idea regarding the extent of inequality
within the agricultural sector for each country group.  The estimated equation is :
                                                          
40The constant term in this case indicates the extent of inequality in the economy in the hypothetical
case when the entire economy is based on industrial activity and the shares of agriculture and service32
(1c)  G = 42.34
*  + 0.10.I + 0.09.S - 22.97
*.D - 0.03 (D*I)  +  0.34
* (D*S),  [Adj. R
2  =0.55]
               (10.26)    (0.14)   (0.14)     (11.47)     (0.16)            (0.17)
 [Note 
*  represents coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level or lower;
figures in parentheses below each coefficient is its White heteroscedasticity-consistent
robust standard error]
The values of the estimated coefficients in this equation suggest that income
inequality within the agricultural sector is significantly lower in the Asian countries
than in the Latin American countries, as indicated by the values of the constant
terms ( 19.37 for the Asian countries and 42.34 for the Latin American countries)
Part C.  Comparison of the Pooled OLS and the Fixed Effects Estimators
When we use the fixed effects estimator to estimate the relation between income
inequality and structural change, we get the following result
41 :
Gini = 50.65 -  0.14  Agr  -  0.11  Ind
                                                      (9.05)    (-1.52)        (-0.91)
where figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
The main difference of these with the pooled ols results is that in this case (i.e. with
fixed effects estimation) the coefficients of both independent variables (Shares of
Agriculture and Industry) are statistically insignificant. However the signs of the
coefficients in both cases remain the same.
A possible reason for this could be as follows. The fixed effects estimator is also
called the within estimator as it uses only the variation in the data within each
country group. This estimator of the slope coefficients simply discards all of the
between-country variation in the data. In contrast, the pooled ols estimator gives
equal weight to the within and between country information.  For a discussion and
proofs of these propositions see Baltagi (1995) and Hsiao (1986) .
We argue that in all probability, in our dataset, between-country variation in the
variables is more prominent than within-country variation.  Possibly the former is a
more dominant factor than the latter and this is the most likely reason we get
statistically significant coefficients with pooled ols estimation (and insignificant
coefficients with fixed effects estimation) . There is support for this argument at two
levels.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
are zero.  We refer to this as inequality within industry as in some sense it seems to represent the
extent of inequality in industrial incomes.
41 The reason we do not use the random effects estimator is, the choice of the random effects model
is ruled out by the Hausman specification test.33
First, the economic variables we are dealing with, viz. income inequality and
measures of structural change, are both known to change quite slowly over time
within a country.  This could be one reason why a priori within country variation in
our dataset would tend to be low.  In fact the results discussed by Li et al. (1998)
highlight one aspect of precisely this issue. These authors study closely the
Deininger and Squire (1996a) dataset on income inequality and find that while
inequality tends to change relatively slowly over time within a country, it tends to be
quite different across country groups.  According to them this is because, income
inequality is affected by political economy factors and structural characteristics of
individual economies
42 and these are quite slow to change over time.  Even though
we have only developing countries in our sample yet structural characteristics are
often quite different between these countries and at times this difference can be
quite substantial. For instance, the Latin American countries differ in several
respects from the Asian countries ; in fact, we incorporate a slope and an intercept
dummy to control for these differences between the two country groups in our pooled
ols regressions.  Given these factors, it seems justified to expect between-country
variation to dominate the within country variation in our sample.  In fact, given there
are differences between individual countries, possibly this would be true for any
cross-country dataset.
Second, results from cross-section regressions also seem to support our
argument that there is substantial between-country variation in the data.  As
described in Part A of the Appendix, we have seven observations per country, each
corresponding to averages over a 5-year period. We now report a few results from
cross-section regressions, each run with average variable values for a 5-year period.
For each equation below we report, the t-statistics based on robust standard
errors, adjusted R
2 and the number of observations in the dataset.
(i)  For the period 1960-64 we get,
Gini  = 75.44  -  0.72. Agr  -  0.33. Ind ,
                      (-6.29)    (-3.06)         (-1.23)
Adjusted R
2 = 0.58 ;    Nob:11
(ii)  For the period 1970-74,
Gini  =  72.49  -  0.64. Agr  -  0.40.Ind ,
            (4.92)     (-3.17)         (-1.12)
                                                          
42 However changes in the sectoral composition of output and employment are not explicitly included
by these authors among their list of structural factors.34
Adjusted R
2  = 0.36 ;     Nob:16
(iii)  For the period 1980-84,
Gini  =  68.73  -  0.64. Agr  -  0.36. Ind ,
             (10.88)  (5.58)          (-1.99)
Adjusted R
2 = 0.52 ;    Nob:15
 
The cross-section results reported above seem to provide some support to our
argument regarding the existence of between-country variation in the data.  At this
juncture we would like to point out that there are pitfalls in drawing conclusions
regarding the relation between income inequality and structural change purely on the
basis of cross-country comparisons. However, our estimates are based on the
pooled ols coefficients, which make use of within country variation in the data as
well.
Further, to check whether or not the results we obtain from our pooled
regressions, apply to change in the variables within a country over time, we run the
same regression using data from individual countries as well. It was not possible to
estimate this relation for each one of the countries in our sample, mainly because of
insufficient number of observations on Gini coefficients for most of them.  We were
able to estimate the relation for 3 of the countries (India, Pakistan and Indonesia),
and the estimated equations in these 3 cases seem to reflect the results (particularly
the signs of the coefficients) we get by pooling the data on all 18 countries. These
equations are,
Indonesia:
Gini  =  47.08  -  0.23 Agr  -  0.51.Ind ,
                                                        (7.29)     (-1.78)        (-2.11)
Adjusted R
2 = 0.25;    Nob : 9
Pakistan:
Gini  =  50.07  -  0.16 Agr  -  0.84 .Ind ,
                                                        (6.62)     (-2.67)       (-2.07)
Adjusted R
2 = 0.47;   Nob : 8
India:
Gini   =  59.94  -  0.27 Agr  -  1.11 Ind ,
                                                        (4.18)     (-2.25)        (-1.86)
Adjusted R
2  =  0.24;  Nob : 12
In view of these results it might seem surprising that the slope coefficients using the
fixed effects estimation procedure were statistically insignificant. The most likely reason35
for this is that for most countries in the sample we have very few observations over time.  As
such, estimates based on simply the within-variation in the data use very little of the total
information available in the dataset and are statistically insignificant.
Table 1A: Urban and Rural Gini Coefficients for Selected Developing Countries
Gini Coefficients Country Year
Rural Urban
Bangladesh 1963 33.0 41.0
1967 33.39 39.9
Brazil 1960 42.29 60.01
1970 44.8 59.9
Chile 1968 39.45 44.0










































Note:  *  indicates rural Gini coefficients exceed the urban Gini coefficients.
(cont’d)36
Table 1 A (cont’d)
Gini Coefficients Country Year
Rural Urban

















Mexico 1963 48.23 52.38






Peru 1971* 56.0 43
1991* 37.1 35.3
1994* 36.7 35
Philippines 1961 41.23 52.59
1965 42.58 53.03
1971* 46.59 45.80
Sri Lanka 1963 46.75 54.10
1970 35.17 41.0
1973 37.32 39.94





Venezuela 1962* 45.2 43.85








Source:  Deininger and Squire (1996a).
Note:  indicates rural Gini coefficients exceed the urban Gini coefficients.37
Table 2A: Details of Missing Observations on Gini Coefficients in the Final Data Set
Country Description of  Data on Gini Coefficients
BANGLADESH There are 7 observations in all corresponding to each of the time periods
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.
BRAZIL There are 6 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients
corresponding to the period, 1965-69.
CHILE There are 5 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients
corresponding to the periods,  1960-64 and 1975-79.
CHINA There are 6 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the period 1965-69.
COLOMBIA There are 4 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the periods, 1960-64, 1965-69 and 1980-84.
COSTA RICA There are 5 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the periods,   1965-69 and  1990-94.
DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
There are 4 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the periods,  1960-64, 1965-69 and 1970-74.
INDIA There are 7 observations in all corresponding to each of the time periods
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.
INDONESIA There are 7 observations in all corresponding to each of the time periods
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.
KOREA REPUBLIC There are 7 observations in all corresponding to each of the time periods
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.
MALAYSIA There are 4 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the periods,  1960-64, 1965-69 and 1990-94.
MEXICO There are 6 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the period,   1970-74.
PAKISTAN There are 6 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the period,  1960-64.
PERU There are 4 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the periods,  1960-64, 1965-69 and 1975-79.
PHILIPPINES There are 4 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the period,  1980-84.
SRI LANKA There are 7 observations in all corresponding to each of the time periods
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.
THAILAND There are 7 observations in all corresponding to each of the time periods
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.
VENEZUELA There are 5 observations in all. We have no data on Gini coefficients for
the periods,  1960-64 and 1965-69.
Notes:
•   The data on Gini coefficients are taken from the high quality data points in the Deininger and Squire
(1996a) dataset.  Whenever there are gaps in this dataset we refer to the more recent compilation of
data on income inequality (UNDP, 1999) and select datapoints from there which are strictly comparable
with and satisfy the same criteria as, the high quality data from Deininger and Squire (1996a). However
as evident from the above table, there still remain a large number of missing observations in our final
dataset.  We list below the details regarding observations chosen from the UNDP (1999).
•   The observations pertaining to the following countries and to the following years are taken from UNDP
(1999) : Brazil (1990, 1991); China (1964, 1970, 1978); Colombia (1993, 1994); Mexico (1994);
Pakistan(1963); Philippines (1975); Sri Lanka (1969); and Thailand (1971).38
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